



CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR REDISTRIBUTION



Q2 2016 in Review

This document is for informational purposes only and all information contained herein is subject to revision and completion. This document does not constitute or form part of an offer to issue or sell any securities or other financial instruments, nor does it constitute a financial promotion, investment advice or an inducement or incitement to participate in any product, offering or investment. Any such offer will be made only by means of a confidential private placement memorandum or such other offering documents as may be delivered by 3-Sigma Value to prospective investors and is subject to the terms and conditions contained therein.

The views, analyses and opinions herein reflect the perspective of 3-Sigma Value. No representation, warranty or undertaking, express or implied, is given as to the accuracy or completeness of the information or opinions contained herein. No reliance may be placed for any purpose on the information and opinions contained in this document or their accuracy or completeness and nothing contained herein shall be relied upon as a promise or representation whether as to past or future performance. Certain information in this document has been derived from materials furnished by outside sources. 3-Sigma Value assumes no responsibility for independent verification of such information and has relied on such information being complete and accurate in all material respects. Nothing contained herein should be construed as legal, business or tax advice. Each prospective investor should consult its own attorney, business adviser and tax adviser as to legal, business, tax and related matters concerning the information contained herein.



Q2 2016 in Review

For the quarter ended June 30, 2016, 3-Sigma Value, LP (the “Partnership”) had an estimated loss of 2.5% (net of management fees and expenses) with average gross exposure of 93.6% and net exposure of negative 19.7%.

3-Sigma Value, LP						
PERFORMANCE AND EXPOSURE STATISTICS ¹						
	Monthly Performance		Average Fund Exposure			
	Gross ²	Net ³	Long	Short	Gross	Net
2011	37.4%	29.9%	78.6%	89.4%	168.1%	-10.8%
2012	32.3%	25.8%	64.8%	79.0%	143.8%	-14.1%
2013	-12.8%	-12.8%	46.7%	72.4%	119.1%	-25.7%
2014	18.1%	14.4%	7.4%	54.9%	62.3%	-47.4%
2015	12.9%	10.3%	22.9%	41.6%	64.5%	-18.7%
January	3.9%	3.1%	39.5%	54.2%	93.7%	-14.7%
February	-2.8%	-2.8%	36.2%	42.8%	79.0%	-6.6%
March	2.0%	1.6%	32.0%	40.8%	72.8%	-8.8%
April	-1.2%	-1.2%	35.0%	54.2%	89.1%	-19.2%
May	0.1%	0.1%	38.2%	60.5%	98.6%	-22.3%
June	-1.4%	-1.4%	37.7%	55.5%	93.2%	-17.7%
2016 YTD	0.4%	0.3%	36.4%	51.3%	87.7%	-14.9%
Cumulative ⁴	111.9%	80.4%				
Annualized ⁴	14.6%	11.3%				

1 All performance statistics listed herein have been audited by an independent third party auditor with the exception of the statistics for any period after December 31, 2014, which are unaudited estimates confirmed by an independent third party administrator.


2 Net of management fee and expenses.

3 Net of incentive fee.

4 Since January 2011.

The Partnership’s portfolio, both long and short, focuses its investment efforts in three industries – Technology, Media & Telecom (“TMT”), Natural Resources, and Financials. In total, 3-Sigma Value, LP is invested long in 19 companies, and short 25 companies. Our investment

CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR REDISTRIBUTION




3-SIGMA VALUE

approach is global in scope, yet, at this time, North American equities constitute the vast majority of our gross exposure. We are market-cap agnostic.

As of June 30, 2016, the 3-Sigma Value portfolio had gross long exposure of 37.1% and gross short exposure of 53.0%, for net investment exposure of negative 15.9%. As value investors frequently targeting companies facing rapidly changing operating performance and/or market perceptions, we remain cognizant that portfolio correlation to the market can change on a dime and thus the continuity between the past and future is tenuous at best. Notwithstanding this caveat, we generally seek overall market agnosticism in the construction of the portfolio as reflected in a target range of net exposure between negative 25% and positive 25%.

Balance Sheet (% Of Equity) - 6/30/16				
	<u>Long</u>	<u>Short</u>	<u>Gross</u>	<u>Net</u>
By Industry				
Technology	9.6%	-24.7%	34.3%	-15.0%
Natural Resources	13.4%	-14.7%	28.2%	-1.3%
Financials	14.0%	-13.6%	27.7%	0.4%
Total	37.1%	-53.0%	90.1%	-15.9%
By Geography				
North America	34.3%	-49.4%	83.7%	-15.1%
South America	2.8%	0.0%	2.8%	2.8%
EMEA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Asia	0.0%	-3.6%	3.6%	-3.6%
Total	37.1%	-53.0%	90.1%	-15.9%
By Market Capitalization				
Greater than \$1B	23.0%	-24.8%	47.8%	-1.8%
\$500M - \$1B	5.0%	-8.5%	13.5%	-3.5%
Less than \$500M	9.1%	-19.7%	28.8%	-10.6%
Total	37.1%	-53.0%	90.1%	-15.9%
# of Positions				
# of Long Positions	19			
# of Short Positions	25			
Total # of Positions	44			

CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR REDISTRIBUTION




Shortly after the Brexit vote, the stock market fully recovered from its initial drop and proceeded to make a new all-time high. Throughout the quarter, stocks trudged up a wall of rationalization accompanied by an unusually low level of volatility. The disconnect between real events and the stock market is as pronounced as it's ever been, with the market shrugging off global geopolitical dysfunction in a time of global economic slowdown as reflected in negative earnings across industries (not just energy/commodities) and negative interest rates from Japan to Europe.

When I look back at the historical long/short attribution for 3-Sigma Value, we have never experienced a run of negative months on the short side as long as the one we're on now. In January, the short portfolio gained 8.5% as the market tumbled to start the year. Since then, the shorts have registered five straight negative months such that year-to-date short attribution is negative 0.4% (offset by positive 1.0% long attribution). The longest streak of negative months on the short side prior to this one was three months. Following is monthly long/short attribution so far this year.

		3-Sigma Value Long/Short Attribution						
2016		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	YTD
Performance	Gross	3.9%	-2.8%	2.0%	-1.2%	0.1%	-1.4%	0.4%
	Net	3.1%	-2.8%	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%	0.3%
Attribution	Long	-4.7%	-1.9%	4.3%	1.3%	0.5%	1.5%	1.0%
	Short	8.5%	-0.9%	-2.3%	-2.5%	-0.4%	-2.9%	-0.4%
Exposure	Long	39.5%	36.2%	32.0%	35.0%	38.2%	37.7%	36.4%
	Short	54.2%	42.8%	40.8%	54.2%	60.5%	55.5%	51.3%
	Net	-14.7%	-6.6%	-8.8%	-19.2%	-22.3%	-17.7%	-14.9%
	Gross	93.7%	79.0%	72.8%	89.1%	98.6%	93.2%	87.7%

This run of negative monthly returns on the short side is unprecedented, and as a statistician and contrarian I believe it will end soon. While Keynes' maxim that "*markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent*" informs our risk-taking at 3-Sigma Value, it is precisely at times like this, approaching the point of maximum disconnect, when the disconnect becomes an inflexion point, and the greatest opportunities for profit manifest. While I don't believe in market timing *per se*, the average expected return on the 25 shorts in the portfolio is 74.5% (includes nine zeroes), up from 57.2% at the start of the year. A higher expected return directly translates to a higher actual return. This correlation is statistically significant. Therefore, as we enter what should be a profitable period for the short portfolio, we illustrate our investment process by profiling one of our new favorite shorts: **Atlassian Corporation Plc (TEAM)**, the

CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR REDISTRIBUTION



last technology company to go public in 2015, ending the IPO exuberance that followed implementation of the JOBS Act (Jumpstart Our Business Startups).


In 2012, I published an analysis of **Jive Software (JIVE)** called "*Polishing Turd*". Originally published in Chapter 3 of *Software Economics – Volume II*, it is available in the research section of our website at www.3sigmavalue.com. JIVE sells workplace collaboration software that increases productivity, produces fewer emails, and overall lowers cost. The problem is that workplace collaboration software is already the most popular and commoditized SaaS application (by function) with low complexity and low IP value. Moreover, competition is free/freemium and fierce. Salesforce.com's Chatter is offered for free, at the entry level. Microsoft's sells Yammer and Sharepoint, integrated with Dynamics. IBM's enterprise collaboration products include Lotus Quikr and Lotus Live, in addition to IBM Connections products. Google, EMC/Documentum, H-P, ServiceNow, Zendesk, and TIBCO (TIBX) all offer collaboration software, in most cases giving it away to customers at no incremental cost.

The latest flavor of collaboration software is sold by an Australian-based developer called Atlassian that went public on December 8, 2015 at \$21 per share with the clever ticker TEAM. TEAM sells collaboration software that was originally designed for software development teams but has since expanded to other areas of the enterprise including marketing, operations, and HR. 75% of 2015 bookings were on-premise and 25% SaaS; however, according to the company, ~80% of new customers are choosing SaaS (a curious inflection).

TEAM does not have a traditional direct sales force; instead, 98% of sales are transacted through TEAM's website, including the ~25% sold through indirect channels, which are focused on regions where there are language barriers. As a result, S&M as a % of revenue is at the low end of its peers. The savings on S&M enables a higher level of R&D (R&D ~40% of revenue).

TEAM's products include: (1) Jira (~50% of sales) – software for tracking and managing tasks/projects, mainly used by developers tracking bugs in software. IBM Rational and Connections, Microsoft Project, CA VersionOne and Rally, SAP, and H-P all offer comparable products. (2) Confluence (~30% of sales) – document collaboration software used by intranet pages or the IT department creating how-to reference pages. Competes against Microsoft SharePoint, Google Docs/Drive, etc. (3) HipChat (<5% of sales) – real time collaboration and messaging; competes mainly against Microsoft Skype for Business (Lync), VMWare's SocialCast, Slack, Concerto, and Asana (Justin Moskowitz). (4) Jira Service Desk (<5% of

CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR REDISTRIBUTION



sales) – new derivation of Jira that competes against ServiceNow (NOW), CA, IBM, H-P, and BMC (Bain LBO at 3.1x / 9.6x revenue/EBITDA in 2013).

While TEAM spends on R&D as much as any software company in our universe, the core tenet of its business strategy – to sell software without a direct sales force – is flawed if TEAM wants to expand up-market and across the enterprise where direct sales is necessary. If not, then growth will stagnate and TEAM’s valuation will compress. This is a binary, lose-lose situation. Ultimately, TEAM will be compelled to chase growth and build-out a salesforce, ending any hope of operating leverage.


In determining the quality of a technology business, we quantify using four factors: (1)

Gross Margin (GM) – shows how much technology content is in each sale. A lower gross margin means the vendor is paying someone else, generally in the form of a license or royalty. The most efficient technology companies that develop all of their IP in-house report gross margins above 90%. On the other end of the spectrum, vendors that license or pay royalties on technology developed elsewhere report gross margins closer to 60%. TEAM’s gross margin is a solid 83%, reflecting in-house IP.

(2) Cumulative R&D / R&D as a % of Revenue + Cumulative Capex / Capex as a % of Revenue – signals the value of the underlying intellectual property (IP). While plenty of companies waste money developing technologies that don’t work or aren’t wanted, if a company doesn’t spend any money at all on research and development (R&D) then how can it purport to be a technology company? TEAM spend 46% on R&D in the most recent quarter (1Q 2016), equating to \$54 million and growing. This is a tremendous investment in technology, but one that is dependent on a similarly-tremendous under-investment in sales.

(3) Operating Margin (OM) – shows how efficiently a company is managed. Technology is scalable and the cost of technology deflationary due to innovation and Moore’s Law. R&D expenses tend to be relatively consistent over time while operating leverage is earned in sales and marketing (S&M), and general and administrative (G&A) to a lesser extent. This is where TEAM’s business model breaks down. Despite under-investing in S&M, TEAM still does not make money. EBIT is negative while D&A pushes EBITDA above breakeven in 2017. This is low quality EBITDA.

CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR REDISTRIBUTION



3-SIGMA VALUE


(4) **Ultimately, cash is what matters**, not earnings. 2016E EBITDA ~ zero translates into free cash flow of approx. \$65 million, entirely due to \$70 million of stock compensation. In our Base Case Operating Scenario 1, we assume TEAM adds approximately 10,000 net clients each year. In this scenario, EBITDA grows to \$45 million (90.6x EBITDA) in 2018 with FCF ~\$100 million.

TEAM Capitalization as of 3/31/16	
Price at December 9, 2014 IPO	\$21.00
Price at end of 1st day	\$27.78
Price as of June 30, 2016	\$25.90
FD Shares Outstanding	212,920
Market Capitalization	5,514,628
Debt	0
Cash & Equivalents	723,275
Enterprise Value (EV)	4,791,353
EV / Revenue - 2015	12.4x
EV / Revenue - 2016E	9.3x
EV / Revenue - 2017E	6.9x
EV / Revenue - 2018E	5.1x

Short Thesis

1. Competition is overwhelming as comparable/better collaboration products are offered by MSFT SharePoint, CRM Chatter, GOOG, IBM, HPQ, etc.
2. Jira is old, on-premise software that was released in 2002. Confluence was launched in 2004 also for on-premise deployments. Jira and Confluence are widely acknowledged not to be best-in-breed.
3. TEAM will have to build-out a sales force if it wants to compete for business across the enterprise. Reality will eventually crush the mission of the company, which is to “*set conventional wisdom on its ear by launching a successful enterprise software company with no sales force.*”
4. Mission-oriented marketing emphasizes culture while de-emphasizing technology. A red flag is raised when employees are referred to as something other than employees; in this case they are Atlassians. See their website for promotional videos that say nothing about the product.
5. Valuation is irrationally exuberant, especially given no meaningful EBIT, EBITDA or EPS through 2018 at the earliest.

CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR REDISTRIBUTION




Valuation Analysis

We identify the significant assumptions (factors) underlying our analysis of Atlassian (TEAM):

1. Net new customers – 2016 guidance implies flattish customer additions ~ 3,000 per quarter; range = 6,000-14,000 per year. The midpoint is lower than 2016 guidance because after saturating its core mid-market, TEAM is moving upstream to fewer but larger customers.
2. Revenue per customer – 2016 guidance implies flattish ARPU; cross-selling is offset by deflationary forces. Range = 0%-10%.
3. Gross margin – flattish around LQA ~ 83%. Minor accretion/dilution in the upside/downside cases.
4. Operating Expenses
 - a. R&D – increasing \$2 million to \$10 million per quarter (upside/downside).
 - b. S&M – flattish around LQA; no operating leverage. Downside cases assume TEAM begins building a direct sales force in 2017/2018.
 - c. G&A – Upside is flattish around LQA; downside is LQA as a % of revenues, reflecting no operating leverage; base cases are in between.
 - d. Stock compensation – flattish in connection with a stagnant stock price; base = rolling avg. LTM.
5. Capital expenditures – approx. \$50 million per year is an estimate based on management commentary.
6. WACC = 10% / Terminal Value Multiple = range of 10x (downside) to 25x EBITDA (upside).


M&A Comps - Systems & Data Management Software					
Target	Acquirer	Date	Valuation	Revenue	EBITDA
Qlik Technologies (QLIK)	Thoma Bravo	Jun-16	2,700	3.4x	NM
Informatica (INFA)	Permira, CPPIB	Apr-15	5,300	4.6x	25.5x
Tibco Software (TIBX)	Vista Equity	Sep-14	4,300	4.0x	18.0x
Compuware (CPWR)	Thoma Bravo	Sep-14	2,500	3.4x	22.5x
BMC Software (BMC)	Bain and G. Gate	May-13	6,900	3.1x	9.6x
Quest Software (QSFT)	Dell	Mar-12	2,400	2.6x	8.6x
Average				3.5x	16.8x

CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR REDISTRIBUTION



Atlassian (TEAM) Financial Summary - Base Case Operating Scenario 1					
CYE	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Paid Customers - start of period		42,800	54,262	66,431	76,431
Net New Customers		11,462	12,169	10,000	10,000
Paid Customers - end of period		54,262	66,431	76,431	86,431
% Growth			22%	15%	13%
Paid Customers - average		48,531	60,347	71,431	81,431
Revenue Per Customer		7.98	8.46	8.46	8.46
% Growth			6.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Other	7,782	15,884	30,399	36,572	41,691
% of Revenue	3.6%	4.1%	6.0%	6.1%	6.1%
Total Revenue	215,109	387,338	510,317	604,053	688,618
% Growth		80.1%	31.7%	18.4%	14.0%
Deferred Revenue	89,200	136,500	175,528	212,099	253,791
Change in Deferred Revenue		47,300	39,028	36,572	41,691
Bookings	304,309	523,838	685,845	640,625	730,309
Cost of Revenue	37,986	63,625	85,516	101,224	115,394
Gross Profit	177,123	323,713	424,802	502,830	573,223
% Margin	82.3%	83.6%	83.2%	83.2%	83.2%
Operating Expenses					
R&D	78,640	173,391	252,680	276,680	300,680
as a % of Revenue	36.6%	44.8%	49.5%	45.8%	43.7%
S&M	34,968	76,979	105,731	125,152	142,672
as a % of Revenue	16.3%	19.9%	20.7%	20.7%	20.7%
G&A	41,984	68,246	101,966	113,248	119,314
as a % of Revenue	19.5%	17.6%	20.0%	18.7%	17.3%
Total Opex	155,592	318,616	460,377	515,080	562,666
as a % of Revenue	72.3%	82.3%	90.2%	85.3%	81.7%
EBIT	21,531	5,097	-35,575	-12,250	10,557
+ D&A	7,139	17,719	24,496	29,496	34,496
= EBITDA	28,670	22,816	-11,080	17,245	45,053
Other Income (Expense)	697	-692	752	752	752
Pre-tax Income	22,228	4,405	-34,823	-11,498	11,309
Taxes	3,246	1,149	-3,111	0	0
% Rate	14.6%	26.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Net Income	18,982	3,256	-31,712	-11,498	11,309
NOPAT	18,387	3,767	-35,575	-12,250	10,557
+ D&A	13,316	17,719	24,496	29,496	34,496
+ Stock Comp	11,364	41,534	70,801	70,801	70,801
as a % of Revenue	5.3%	10.7%	13.9%	11.7%	10.3%
+/- Change in WC	6,283	-1,765	10,924	0	0
+/- Change in Deferred Revenue	24,785	47,381	39,028	36,572	41,691
- Capex	-8,110	-27,126	-43,812	-50,000	-50,000
= Free Cash Flow	62,992	82,840	65,861	74,618	107,545

CONFIDENTIAL – NOT FOR REDISTRIBUTION



3-SIGMA VALUE


On a probability-weighted basis, TEAM is worth \$8.75 per share (down 66.2%), which is equivalent to 3.8x 2018 Base Case 2 revenue, a premium to the 3.5x paid in comparable M&A transactions.

Atlassian (TEAM - Valuation Summary)						
	Live	Upside	Base 1	Base 2	Base 3	Downside
WACC	10%					
Net New Customers - 2018	10,000	14,000	12,000	10,000	8,000	6,000
Revenue	688,618	745,581	713,987	688,618	663,248	629,607
EBITDA	45,053	157,954	58,468	45,053	31,638	-59,354
Free Cash Flow	107,545	223,895	122,496	107,545	92,594	-435
PV of UCFC (2016-2018)	202,341	375,806	217,669	202,341	187,013	41,331
Terminal Value Multiple (10x-20x)	16.8x	25.0x	16.8x	16.8x	16.8x	10.0x
Terminal Valuation	568,661	2,966,830	737,989	568,661	399,333	0
Net Cash (Debt)	723,275	723,275	723,275	723,275	723,275	723,275
Equity Value	1,494,277	4,065,911	1,678,932	1,494,277	1,309,621	764,606
per share	7.02	19.10	7.89	7.02	6.15	3.59
Implied Multiple of 2018 Revenue	3.2x	6.2x	3.1x	3.1x	3.1x	1.6x
Probability		20%	20%	20%	20%	20%
Prob-weighted target price	\$8.75	3.82	1.58	1.40	1.23	0.72
Upside (Downside)	-66.2%					
Implied Multiple of 2018 Revenue	3.8x					
Implied Multiple of 2018 EBITDA	57.4x					

Upside Analysis (Quantifying the Risk)

In an Upside Case operating scenario, in which revenue per customer increases 10% per annum and net new clients rises to 4,000 per q (up from 3,000), EBITDA jumps to \$275 million in 2018, producing \$350 million of free cash flow. Furthermore, we apply a premium take-out multiple of 25x EBITDA to the Upside Case scenario, incorporating the potential upside from a take-out into the valuation. Upside equity value per share = \$30.07.

Finally, we are highly cognizant of the risk of a short-squeeze. We assess potential short squeeze risk in terms of the number of days to cover (11 days). This is a benign number. Over 30 days signals a high degree of short squeeze risk; 15 to 30 days represents moderate risk; below 15 represents low risk.



IMPORTANT INFORMATION

This document is for informational purposes only and all information contained herein is subject to revision and completion. This document does not constitute or form part of an offer to issue or sell, or of a solicitation of an offer to subscribe or buy, any securities or other financial instruments, nor does it constitute a financial promotion, investment advice or an inducement or incitement to participate in any product, offering or investment. Any such offer will be made only by means of a confidential private placement memorandum or such other offering documents as may be delivered by 3-Sigma Value to prospective investors and is subject to the terms and conditions contained therein. The information set forth herein does not purport to be complete. The offering memorandum will contain additional information about the terms and conditions of an investment in this opportunity and risk disclosures that are important to any investment decision and should be read completely before a prospective investor considers making an investment.

The views, analyses and opinions reflected herein reflect the perspective of 3-Sigma Value. No representation, warranty or undertaking, express or implied, is given as to the accuracy or completeness of the information or opinions contained herein. No reliance may be placed for any purpose on the information and opinions contained in this document or their accuracy or completeness and nothing contained herein shall be relied upon as a promise or representation whether as to past or future performance. Certain information in this document has been derived from materials furnished by outside sources. 3-Sigma Value assumes no responsibility for independent verification of such information and has relied on such information being complete and accurate in all material respects. Nothing contained herein should be construed as legal, business or tax advice. Each prospective investor should consult its own attorney, business adviser and tax adviser as to legal, business, tax and related matters concerning the information contained herein.

This document contains confidential information and the recipient hereof agrees to maintain the confidentiality of such information. This document is intended solely for the information of the person to whom it has been delivered. Distribution of this information to any person other than the person to whom it has been originally delivered and to the advisers of such person who are also subject to a duty of confidentiality is unauthorized, and any reproduction or transmission of these materials, in whole or in part, or the divulgence of any of its contents to third parties, without the prior consent of 3-Sigma Value, is prohibited.

Statements, estimates and projections with respect to future outcomes are based on assumptions made by 3-Sigma Value, which may or may not prove to be correct. Nothing contained herein is, or should be relied upon as, a promise, representation, prediction or projection of future performance of the investment. No representation is made as to the accuracy of any statements, estimates or projections contained herein.

The distribution of this document may be restricted in certain jurisdictions. The information herein is for general guidance only, and it is the responsibility of any person or persons in possession of this document to inform themselves of, and to observe, all applicable laws and regulations of any relevant jurisdiction. This document is not intended for distribution to, or use by any person or entity in any jurisdiction or country where such distribution or use would be contrary to local law or regulation.